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JENNIFER L. JOHNSON, ET. AL. V. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA
106 F. Supp. 2D 1362 (2000)
FACTS
Jennifer Johnson, Aimee Bogrow, and Molly Ann Beckenhauer (Plaintiffs)
are white females who applied for admission to the University of Georgia
(UGA).1 Plaintiffs alleged that they were denied admission based on their race
and gender,2 and further contended that UGA's admission policy violates 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI) and 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Title IX) because the policy
favored some applicants over others based on race and sex.3
UGA had a three-tiered admissions process in which applicants were
evaluated based on their Academic Index (AI), Total Student Index (TSI), and
Edge Reading (ER).4 In the first tier, UGA used an applicant's high school
grade point average (GPA) and standardized test scores [ACT or SAT] to
calculate the AI.5 In 1999, when the plaintiffs were denied admission,
applicants with an AI of at least 2.86 (or 2.81 from a "most difficult" high
school curriculum) and a "specified minimum SAT score" were automatically
admitted.
In the second tier, applicants who had not been automatically admitted, but
whose Al was above 2.40, were re-ranked using their TSI.6 To calculate an
applicant's TSI, UGA added "points" or "plus factors" to the applicant's AI
for certain characteristics, including gender and race.7 Non-white applicants
received 0.5 TSI points and male applicants received 0.25 TSI points.8 Based
on this new score, UGA automatically admitted those with TSIs above 4.92
and denied admission to those with TSIs below 4.66. 9 In the third tier, UGA
analyzed applicants with TSIs between 4.66 and 4.92 under the ER process."0
In this process, readers scrutinized the applications of applicants who were "at
the 'edge' of the admissions pool," to find "qualities that might not have been
apparent at the Al and TSI stages" of the admissions process.1
1. Johnson v. University of Georgia, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
2. Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
3. 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1366 (using the term "gender"instead of "sex" in Title IX. However, this





8. Id. at 1367.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. (citing Tracy v. Bd. of Regents, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1317 (S.D.Ga. 1999)).
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Plaintiff Johnson was assigned a TSI of 4.10 and denied admission. 2 If
she were a non-white male, her TSI would have been 4.8513 and she would
have had her application analyzed under the ER process and might have been
offered admission. Plaintiff Beckenhauer received a TSI of 4.06 and would
have been assigned a TSI of 4.8 1,14 were she a non-white male. Like Johnson,
Beckenhauer's application would have been subjected to ER analysis if she
had been awarded additional points for race and gender.15 Plaintiff Bogrow
received a TSI of 4.52 and would have been admitted had she received 0.75
points for being a non-white male. 6
Plaintiffs each brought a claim against UGA under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d,
which prohibits racial discrimination, and 20 U.S.C. § 1681, which prohibits
sex discrimination. 7 The claims were consolidated by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, Savannah Division.'
8
Plaintiffs, defendant, and defendant-intervenors all moved for summary
judgment.' 9
HOLDING
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia held
that UGA's interest in "diversity" was not compelling. 2° Its policy of
assigning TSI points for race and gender violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and 20
U.S.C. § 1681.2 The court denied the Defendant's motion for summary
judgment and granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, in part.22
ANALYSIS
The court began by analyzing the appropriate standard of review for
Plaintiffs' Title VI racial discrimination claim. Section 601 of Title VI
provides, "no person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
12. 106 F. Supp. 2d. at 1367.
13. 4.10 (TSI) + 0.50 (non-white "plus factor") + 0.25 (male "plus factor") = 4.85.
14. 4.06 (TSI) + 0.50 (non-white "plus factor") + 0.25 (male "plus factor") = 4.81.
15. Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
16. id. (4.52 + 0.50 (non-white "plus factor") + 0.25 (male "plus factor") = 5.27).
17. Id.
18. 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1365 n.1.
19. Id. at 1365.
20. Id. at 1375.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1380 (denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, in part, on the ground that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to recover damages for infliction of emotional distress).
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or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."'
The court determined that claims arising under Title VI should be analyzed
exactly the same as claims arising under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 24 First, Plaintiffs had to establish that UGA acted
with discriminatory intent.' Racial discrimination claims under the Equal
Protection Clause are evaluated under a strict scrutiny standard, so the same
standard must be applied to Title VI racial discrimination.26 Under strict
scrutiny, UGA should have established that it had a compelling government
interest which justified its race-conscious admissions policy.27 Furthermore,
UGA had to establish that its means were narrowly tailored to further the
compelling interest.28 The court applied strict scrutiny by stating that, "[t]he
threshold issue is whether UGA is justified in using any kind of racial
preference" 29 and "the manner in which the plan considers race goes only to
the issue of whether the plan is 'narrowly tailored.'
3
After determining the appropriate standard of review for the racial
discrimination claim, the court discussed what should be the appropriate
standard for the Title IX gender discrimination claim.3' The language of Title
IX provides, "no person in the United States shall, on the ground of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."32 The court explained that the language used in Titles IX and Title
VI is identical, except that the word "sex" in Title IX replaces the phrase "race,
color, or national origin" in Title VI. 33 The court noted that the drafters of
Title IX patterned the statute after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196431
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The parties do not dispute that this statutory section applies to UGA's
admissions process. UGA receives federal funds and considers applicants' race during the admissions
process.
24. Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2d. at 1366; see Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484,501 (1lth Cir. 1999);
Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1405-06 n.11 (1lth Cir. 1983); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ, concurring); see
also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 610-11 (1983) (noting that the view that Title
VI claims should be analyzed identically to Fourteenth Amendment claims held the majority in Bakke).
25. Sandoval, 197 F.3d. at 501.
26. Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
27. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (holding that the use of race
as a classification must serve a compelling government interest narrowly tailored to further that interest).
28. SeeAdarand, 515 U.S. at235.
29. 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1369.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1367.
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
33. 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
34. Id.
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and "assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been.""
The court stated, "it is settled that analysis of the two statutes is substantially
the same., 36 Therefore, the standard of analysis for the Title IX claim should
also be strict scrutiny.37
But the court acknowledged that a different standard would be applied to
gender discrimination claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. 38 Gender
discrimination claims are analyzed under an intermediate scrutiny standard.39
Under that standard, a gender-based classification is valid if it furthers an
"important" government interest, and the classification is only "substantially
related" to this interest.40 Despite the lower standard applied to gender
discrimination claims, the court determined that the higher strict scrutiny
standard would apply to gender discrimination claims under Title IX.4I
Because identical language was selected in Title IX and Title VI, they should
be interpreted to require the same level of review.42  Therefore, the court
determined that UGA's interest in promoting diversity in higher education
must also be "compelling.
43
UGA relied heavily on the plurality opinion authored by Justice Powell
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke" to support its position
that diversity in university admissions policy constituted a compelling state
interest.45 In Bakke, a white male applicant twice denied admission to the
medical school of the University of California at Davis sued the institution
because of its dual-track admissions program that ensured the admission of
certain minority students, including those with lower test scores and grades
than Bakke.46 The high court decided the set aside program violated the
Fourteenth Amendment, but also decided that race was a permissible factor in
admissions decisions.
47
35. Id. at 1367 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-96 (1979)).
36. Id. (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 911 F.2d 617, 619 (1 1th Cir. 1990), rev'd
on other grounds, 503 U.S. 60 (1992)).
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1247 n .4 (9th Cir. 1994)) (noting that a gender-
based classification is upheld if the government can show that it is substantially related to an important
governmental interest).
39. Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d at 1227.
40. Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1227 n.4.
41. Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1367 (citing Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 107 F.3d 609,
614 (8th Cir. 1997)).
42. 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
43. Id.
44. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-71 (1978).
45. 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
46. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269.
47. 438 U.S. at 320.
[Vol. 7:197
Johnson v. University of Georgia
Justice Powell wrote that "the interest of diversity is compelling in the
context of a university's admissions program," then analyzed whether a race-
conscious university admissions process was a permissible means of obtaining
that goal." Powell indicated that "'a properly devised admissions program
involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin' could pass
constitutional muster."49
UGA asserted that an interest in promoting diversity was "compelling,"
and contended that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was binding on the
district court. UGA also cited Marks v. United States5° in support of its claim
that Powell's opinion was a binding precedent of the Court.
The district court found that UGA mischaracterized the Powell opinion.
5 2
Powell stated that diversity that furthers a compelling state interest considers
a wide variety of characteristics. 53 Racial and ethnic origin was just one of
many important characteristics which should be considered.5' Therefore, a
university admissions process may favorably consider a candidate's racial and
ethnic background, but background alone could not be dispositive of the
decision to offer or deny admission."
The court found that UGA not only misintrepreted Powell's opinion in
Bakke, UGA's reliance on the opinion was misguided.56 First, no other justice
joined that part of Powell's opinion.57 Second, UGA's misconstrued Marks.58
Five Justices held that the admissions policy of the University of California at
Davis was invalid,59 and the "narrowest ground for this decision was the
Stevens group's statutory, Title VI reasoning, rather than Powell's
constitutional holding. '" Third, the Powell opinion is mere dicta because
Powell had not addressed the facts at issue in Bakke.6 Powell's comments
were addressed to the validity of a "Harvard-style" admissions system, which
uses "plus factors" for various attributes, such as race, as a basis to consider
48. Id. at 314.
49. Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2dat 1368 (citingBakke, 438 U.S. at 320).
50. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the results enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds"').
51. Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-72).
52. Id.
53. Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1369.
54. Id.
55. Id. Race or ethnic background may be considered a "plus" but it cannot insulate an applicant
from comparison with all other applicants.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1369.
58. Id. at 1368.
59. Regents of the University of California. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
60. Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 411) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Our settled practice, however, is
to avoid the decision of a constitutional issue if a case can be fairly decided on a statutory ground.").
61. Johnson, 106F. Supp. 2dat 1368.
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applicants separately, rather than UGA's tiered system which used plus-factors
such as race to rank all applicants in a single process.62 Fourth, other Justices
held that Powell's opinion could be valid only as a remedy, "so long as the use
of race to achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering
effects of past discrimination."' 3 The Johnson court also cited the assertion
of Hopwood v. Texas' that Powell's diversity argument, "never represented
the view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case."65
Once the court disposed of UGA's claim that Bakke was binding, it
attempted to "glean from Bakke and other cases the status of the law regarding
the non-remedial use of diversity to justify race-based preferences."66 In none
of the cases cited by UGA did a majority of the Court hold "diversity" to be
a compelling interest. 67 UGA had cited Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educations for its proposition that racial diversity
in higher education is a compelling interest. But O'Connor acknowledged that
whether or not racial diversity in higher education is a compelling state interest
was not at issue.69 In Wygant, four justices determined that even if the state's
"asserted prior discrimination purpose" was compelling, the means of
achieving that interest was not narrowly tailored.'0 In Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co,7 the Court did not reach the issue of whether the interest was
compelling, the program at issue was not narrowly tailored to meet that
objective. UGA relied on Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC7 2 for the
proposition that an interest in racial diversity was "compelling." However,
Metro Broadcasting held that racial diversity was only an "important" state
interest. Furthermore, Metro Broadcasting was overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.73
The court concluded that four principles emerge from "diversity"
jurisprudence. First, courts are suspicious of explicit racial classifications,
particularly those serving non-remedial interests.74 Second, mere racial
balancing (i.e., proportional racial representation as an end its and of itself) is
62. 106 F.2d at 1369.
63. Id. at 1369 (emphasis added by Johnson court).
64. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
65. Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1369 (describing the holding of Hopwood v Texas, 78 F.3d 932,
942).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1370.
68. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
69. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288.
70. Id. at 274, 277-84.
71. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,485-86 (1989).
72. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
73. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 500 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
74. Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.
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clearly unconstitutional.75 Third, to justify race-conscious classifications, a.
state must prove that its interest in promoting racial diversity is
"compelling. '76  As a general matter, an interest that is "ill-defined" or
"amorphous" is insufficiently compelling to justify such classifications. 77
Fourth, a majority of the Court has never held that an interest in racial
diversity is "compelling.
7 1
After the court determined that no court has ever explicitly held that an
interest in racial diversity is compelling, it then asked whether UGA's claimed
interest should be found compelling.79 It answered in the negative and
determined that the state interest in diversity is "amorphous at best."80
The court asserted that the term diversity had been "been loosed from its
denotative moorings" and used in various contexts to justify many different
constitutionally questionable policies.8 The court contended that "diversity"
is often "exploited by government officials to avoid answering tough.
questions. ' '82 The court found UGA's definition of "diversity" was clearly
unconstitutional "diversity" because "diversity" was synoymous with "racial
proportionality. 8 3 UGA admitted that the goal of its admissions procedure
was "to be representative of the total population of the state" and that it wanted
"particularly to increas[e] the representation of African-Americans within the
University of Georgia student body."'84
To establish the educational benefits of a diverse student body, UGA.
relied on testimonials from several school officials, including university
president Charles Knapp.85 Knapp testified that after graduation, students must
work cooperatively with people from "different ethnic and cultural
backgrounds," that the skill "cannot be fully acquired by students whose
educational and life experiences have been racially or culturally homogenous,"
that students "benefit educationally and economically from interaction with
75. Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1368 (See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (O'Conner, J.,
dissenting) (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 507).
76. 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1370.
77. Id. at 1371.
78. Id. at 1375.
79. Id. at 1369.
80. Id. at 1371.
81. Id. (citing Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1998))
(explaining "how much burden the term 'diversity' has been asked to bear in the latter part of the 20th
century in the United States"); See also Tracy v. Bd. of Regents, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1321-22 (cited by the
Johnson court for the proposition that "the very concept of 'diversity' has 'become so malleable that it can
instantly be conscripted to march in any ideologue's army, and exploited by government officials to avoid
answering tough questions."')
82. Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 137 (quoting Tracy, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 1321-1322).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1371.
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peers drawn from diverse backgrounds and experiences," and contended that
racial diversity "fosters and awareness of commonalities and enables students
to make friends, forge relationships, and develop group identities on bases
other than shared ethnic, geographic, or socioeconomic background. 86 Knapp
relied on his experiential knowledge as a university instructor and
administrator and on his interactions with other members of UGA' s faculty to
prove his point."
The district court found that argument deeply flawed. It said Knapp's
assertions were based on "syllogism and mere speculation.88 It characterized
Knapp's testimony as constitutionally questionable because it relied on the
very same stereotypes the law explicitly condemns, 9 and that "[tihe moral
imperative of racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection
Clause." The court said that UGA's presumption was that all members of a
particular race think and act in the same way as other members of that race,
and that non-whites think and act differently than whites. 9° It was this
difference which UGA presumed would contribute to students' educational
experience. 9' However, that presumption was based on impermissible racial
stereotypes.92 Further, the court determined that UGA' s "amorphous" interests
had "no principled stopping point,"9' whereas an "interest capable of'justifying
race-conscious measures must be sufficiently specific and verifiable, such that
it supports only limited and carefully defined uses of racial classifications." 94
The court concluded that UGA's interest in "student body diversity" could not
meet that high standard because UGA had not defined when or how that goal
would be met.95 UGA admitted that it had "never been given a numeric or a
percentage target ... I don't know if it would end tomorrow or a hundred
years from tomorrow.
' 96
After analyzing the Title VI race discrimination claim, the court applied
the same analysis to the gender discrimination claim, and invalidated the use
86. Id. at 1371-1372.
87. ld. at 1372.
88. Id.
89. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1994) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410
(1991)) ("[Courts] may not accept as a defense to racial discrimination the very stereotype the law
condemns.").
90. Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.
91. id. at 1372.
92. Id. at 1372 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 602) (O'Conner, J., dissenting) (stating
that a state "may not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals based on the assumption that race or




96. Id. at 1373.
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of "plus factors" for gender.97 The bases for this decision were the same as
those applied to the Title VI claim.9 8
CONCLUSION
The question of whether racial diversity is sufficiently compelling to
justify non-remedial race-based classifications reveals a clear rift between the
circuits. The Fifth Circuit in Hopwood and now a district court in the Eleventh
Circuit in Johnson have held that diversity in education is not a compelling
state interest. District courts in the Sixth Circuit" have reached inapposite
decisions on the same case. Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit" reaffirmed the
"diversity" holding in Bakke.
Race-based classifications which remedy the lingering effects of past
discrimination are constitutionally permissible. Few cases involving non-
remedial consideration of race addressed the threshold question of whether
racial diversity is sufficiently compelling to pass strict scrutiny analysis.
The Ninth Circuit addressed both the issues of non-remedial racial
consideration and whether a state's interest in it was compelling in Hunter v.
Regents of the University.'' The Hunter court concluded that the state's
interest in considering the race and ethnicity of children admitted to a research-
oriented elementary school devoted to improving urban public schools was
compelling. The lower court noted that the defendant-school present "an
unexhaustive list of such issues and challenges[that] includes limited language
proficiency, different learning styles, involvement of parents from diverse
cultures with different expectations and values, and racial and ethnic conflict
among families and children.' ' 2
The district court agreed with the school's director when he concluded
that, "There is no more pressing problem facing California, or indeed the
nation, than urban education; for it is in the urban school system that the
majority of California's future citizens will be educated (either well or poorly),
creating the basic fabric for the society of the future.'1
0 3
After answering the question affirmatively, the circuit moved to the next
prong in the analysis: whether the manner in which the state considers race is
97. Id. at 1376.
98. Id.
99. Gratz v. Bd of Regents of the Univ. of Michigan, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (2000).
100. Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 121 S.Ct.
186, October 2, 2000.
101. Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061.
102. Hunter, 190 F.3d at 1064.
103. Id. at 1065.
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narrowly tailored to further this compelling interest. The Ninth Circuit found
that the research school's "consideration of race/ethnicity in its admissions
process was narrowly tailored to further that interest," because, "[i]t would not
be possible, nor would it be reasonable, to require the defendants to attempt to
obtain an ethnically diverse representative sample of students without the use
of specific racial targets and classifications."'"
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
two judges addressed these issues in a case that nearly mirrors the facts of
Johnson, Gratz v. Board of Regents of the University of Michigan'05 and
Grutter v. Board of Regents of the University of Michigan"° In diametric
opposition to the Georgia district court, the Gratz court held, "To the extent
that the University Defendants assert Bakke's holding to be that 'a properly
devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race
and ethnic origin"' is constitutional, this Court agrees.' ' 7 Further, the court
expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit reasoning in Hopwood, first by asserting
that the Hopwood court is the only circuit to have discarded the concept of
diversity as a compelling interest, and second, by utilizing the language of the
"vigorous" Hopwood dissent, that reports of Bakke's demise were
premature.'0°
Gratz addressed Michigan's undergraduate admission program. Grutter
addressed the similiarly-structured admissions policy at Michigan's law
school. The Grutter court concluded, "Justice Powell's discussion of the
diversity rationale is not among the governing standards to be gleaned from
Bakke... Bakke does not stand for the proposition that a university's desire
to assemble a racially diverse student body is a compelling state interest."'"
The court enjoined the law school from continuing the current admissions
policy, but the Sixth Circuit stayed the injunction, pending appeal." 0
Although the high court denied certiorari in Hopwood and Hunter, the day
draws inexorably closer as to when the high court will settle the racial
diversity matter once and for all.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Phylissa Mitchell
104. Id.
105. Gratz v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Michigan, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (2000).
106. Grutter v. Bd. of Regents of the Uni. of Michigan. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3256.
107. See Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 819 (citations omitted).
108. 122 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
109. Grutter, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3256, at 77.
110. Grutter v. Bollinger, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5606.
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